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ing across borders and with close ties to terrorism); 3 and the social protests of 2011 in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, which gathered unexpected political momentum and culminated in the ousting of regimes.
Academic research dealing with the thematic complex of domestic security and related issues is limited, even though the potential risk has been acknowledged. Surprisingly, this gap applies to EU states as well as Maghreb states. In the Maghreb, restrictions have been imposed on information and research addressing this sensitive issue. As yet, cross-sectional essays and studies predominate. They deal with issues such as the stability or resilience of states (Tocci 2011) , the guarantee of security in the Euro-Mediterranean zone (Soltan 2004; Bilgin 2009; Institute Thomas More 2010) , energy security in the western Mediterranean area (e.g. Brauer and Hartley 2000) , the correlation of environmental deficits and security (e.g. Brauch et al. 2003 ), NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and its significance for the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean "zone of peace and stability" (e.g. Ortega 2000), as well as individual challenges to security such as illegal migration (e.g. Mattes 2006; Middle East Institute 2010) and the protection of intellectual property (Driouchi and Zouag 2008) . 4 The strategies and measures of the individual Maghreb governments vary, as the social conditions (see below) in each state generate security deficits that differ in extent and intensity.
However, government counter-measures follow a uniform structural pattern consisting of a combination of five internally flexible sets of measures:
-First, general institutional-personnel measures aimed at enhancing the efficiency of the police forces and security agencies. Usually these measures, which the Maghreb media term "police reform", entail the optimisation of existing structures, not conceptual and normative restructuring.
-Second, measures for improving security forces' material and technological equipment and the control of public areas.
-Third, legislative measures for the improvement of the legal order.
-Fourth, measures in the field of bilateral, regional or international cooperation for the optimisation of national counter-measures against security deficits.
-Fifth, preventive measures to reduce the development of terrorist and criminal structures as well as the eruption of violent protests.
Thus, the individual operative measures are extremely diverse. The distinct positions assumed by the Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian state leaderships with regard to the necessity of security reforms and legislative measures, as well as divergent priorities, give rise to distinct approaches to countering terrorism, crime and social protests. Additionally, acknowl-3 Corruption is a social phenomenon that hinders development and constitutes one of many criminal offences that undermine domestic security. However, despite its acuteness and omnipresence, it is not included here as an independent category (Serdar 2009 ). 4 Rincón, Ramos and Estévez (2006) is one of the few exceptions; the authors specifically address the issue of soft security (Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and recommendations).
edged technical problems (such as insufficiently trained or badly equipped counter-terrorism and security agencies) can only be tackled if appropriate funding is available. Therefore, each Maghreb state is developing a profile for countering its own domestic security deficits.
The following sections describe the Maghreb states' terrorism and crime countermeasures. 5 The analytical structure includes measures employed in the fields of institutional reform, equipment, legislation, cooperation and prevention. Additionally, comparative criteria are used to critically assess whether the "security measures" have actually reduced security deficits.
Islamist Terrorism

Extent
Terrorism has been present in all Maghreb states since independence. However, the extent and virulence of the phenomenon differs from state to state. Additionally, secular terrorism, which was used in the struggle for political power during the immediate post-colonial transition period, has been almost completely replaced by the terrorism of Islamist groups.
This dominant form of Islamist terrorism has been shaped by the following regional situ- The thematic complex of social protests is ignored here and will be discussed separately given its significance as a trigger for political change (see case studies on Tunisia and Egypt 2011). reconciliation, particularly in the wake of President Bouteflika's election in 1999, significantly reduced confrontations between armed Islamist groups and security agencies. However, it was never possible to fully eliminate terrorism. The Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), which developed out of the GIA in 1999 and in 2007 renamed itself Al-Qaida du Maghreb Islamique (AQMI), 9 thereby emphasising its MaghrebSahel claim to leadership, has continued its attacks against state security institutions and security agency personnel (for details see Roussellier 2011: 5-6) . Unlike the attacks of the 1990s, these attacks have been confined to certain areas on Algerian territory and currently concentrate on Kabylia (in the greater area of Tizi-Ouzou) and Algiers. These regions saw a significant increase in suicide attacks as well as attacks against the army and the police in 2011. 10 Due to the fragile situation in northern Mali and other areas, as well as the topographical features, the southern Sahel region has increasingly developed into a site from which the AQMI can coordinate terrorist-criminal activities. An increasing number of these crimes are conducted in collaboration with local gangs and focus on lucrative criminal acts (in particular, the trafficking of narcotics, cigarettes and humans) including the abduction of foreigners to generate funding for the organisation. looted the arms depots of Qaddafi's army, appropriating large quantities of small arms and portable rockets. As a consequence and due to widespread arms trafficking throughout the Sahel region and Algeria, the availability of weapons for terrorist and criminal acts, particularly for AQMI combat groups, has drastically increased. This is of grave concern to both the security agencies in the respective states and Western states. 
Counter-Measures
The Maghreb states have consistently used all available law enforcement measures to counter militant secular and Islamist groups. In Algeria this task has mainly been in the hands of the armed forces, the intelligence services and special troops since the increase in Islamist activities in 1992. After large losses on both sides, a political solution was successfully reached with the armed Islamist groups at the end of the 1990s. At times these Islamist groups counted up to 28,000 members. Neither GIA nor its successive organisations GSPC/AQMI participated in the political solution.
AQMI continues its attacks. The most recent one was carried out against the Cherchell Military Academy on 26 August 2011 and killed 18 people. The group is also active in Morocco, Tunisia and the Sahel region. The local media regularly questions whether the counterterrorism strategies implemented by the security agencies may be flawed, and whether the local security infrastructure and intelligence agencies are correctly organised and sufficiently prepared, and asks whether reforms are necessary. 15 Regardless of the effectiveness of national anti-terrorism measures, the political leadership of the Maghreb states makes absolutely clear that the responsibility for securing domestic security and fighting terrorism lies with the state. Thus, the introduction of institutional, material and legislative counter-measures is the states' objective.
Institutional-Personnel Level
On the instructions of state leaders (primarily president/king, Ministry of Interior Affairs, Defence Ministry), the security agencies of each Maghreb state have reacted to the terrorist threat with changes to the structure of their security institutions; for example, by forming new special counter-terrorist units or by training and reorganising existing organisational structures. Algeria, the Maghreb state with the most widespread terrorist activity, has substantially increased security staff by employing new personnel and by forming new volunteer organisations, the so-called Groupes de Légitime Defense (GLD). 16 Furthermore, the government and the security agencies have collaborated on counter-terrorism strategies. However, the formal procedures employed by each country have varied, and the actual methods put to use against terrorism have been flexible and subject to adaptation in order to suit new and changing situations. These changes have occurred very frequently in Algeria, making it the country with the most distinct and frequent adaptation procedures.
Several Algerian counter-terrorism measures are of interest. After independence had been achieved, the national army initially focused on defending the country's borders with corresponding weapons systems (tanks, fighter planes). It was thus difficult to adapt to the guerrilla tactics employed by Islamist groups, which retreated to urban slum areas or to topographically inaccessible mountain regions. As it was hard to gain control over both types of area, the fight against Islamist groups made a structural reorientation of the national army 
Equipment Measures
The success of the security agencies in the fight against terrorist groups inevitably requires access to sufficient and suitable equipment and materials. In the 1990s the Algerian military became the first to recognise this. It lacked suitable vehicles for the terrain, night vision instruments, modern communications instruments and transport helicopters, and suffered under slow chains of command in its fight against highly mobile Islamist groups. After corresponding losses in the field and with the provision of foreign support, primarily from the USA and France, the army leadership eliminated these deficits. However, problems continued in the fight against small terrorist groups which operated mainly in urban centres. Extensive supplies of special technical equipment for abduction cases provided to the DGSN and the Gendarmerie Nationale by the USA in 2010 together with the implementation of a large-scale urban surveillance camera system generated success as the localisation, observation and neutralisation of terror cells became more effective. 23 The first simulation of a terrorist attack with chemical weapons and the rehearsal of corresponding counter-measures took place in Tunisia in October 2010. 24
Legislative Measures
In recent years the primary legislative measures of all Maghreb states in the fight against terrorism have been anti-terrorism laws. Due to the extent of fighting between state security agencies and armed Islamist groups, a state of emergency was pronounced in Algeria on 9 February 1992. It was lifted 19 years later on 24 February 2011 to placate the oppositional movement, which had been inspired by the political revolts in Tunisia and Egypt.
Special anti-terrorism laws have been passed at different times in the Maghreb states, with Algeria playing a pioneering role. On 30 September 1992, it issued an anti-terrorism decree 25 providing for the (re)introduction of three courts of state security in Algiers, Oran and Constantine. The specific purpose of these courts was to pass rulings on and impose sentences for terrorist and subversive offences. Pursuant to section 1, a terrorist and subversive act was broadly defined as any criminal offence aimed at harming state security or territorial integrity, or at disrupting the stability and normal service of state institutions. Simultaneously, the rights of defendants were significantly reduced amid criticism from human rights organisations. Even though these courts were later abolished, the provisions of the decree were fully integrated into the criminal code (section 87bis). With regard to the other legal modifications 23 Cf. Mansour, Fidet (2010) All Maghreb states are in favour of the anti-terrorism law planned by the African Union, the first draft of which was completed in December 2010.
Cooperation Level
The transnational character of terrorism in the Maghreb, which is also semantically manifest in the name AQMI, inevitably had the positive effect of causing the security agencies in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to cooperate to some extent, despite the countries' apparent foreign-policy animosities with regard to the fight against terrorism. This intra-Maghreb collaboration 31 primarily consisted of the exchange of personal data on terrorism suspects. However, these efforts were also continued at the regional level in the form of close collaboration with 26 Cf. details in El-Khabar, Algiers, 22 September 2010 and Paying ransom money to Al-Qa'idah should be crimi- 
Preventive Level
Prevention occurs within both a broader and a narrower context. The broader context includes all state measures that improve the economic and social conditions in the state, and thus also improve the future prospects of youths and young adults. The conclusion, expressed by Algerian foreign minister Medelci and others, that the Sahel region requires development as a prerequisite for prevailing in the fight against AQMI 35 and for reducing susceptibility to terrorism is accurate. This observation applies equally to the entire Maghreb.
Therefore, efforts to increase development in rural areas and to reduce youth unemployment are important economic policy measures. The narrower context includes all political measures (e.g. the offer of amnesty; the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, which was accepted in Algeria in a referendum in 2005) and all religious-policy measures which are applicable in the struggle against religious extremism and in efforts to deradicalise the mem- bers of Islamist terrorist groups. Two aspects play a major role: the state's religious policy, with a focus on moderate teachings, 36 and, at the personal level, individual supervision and care for militant Islamists with the aim of deradicalising them. 37 Initial steps have been taken in both areas. However, these measures are still far from exhausted.
Organised Crime in the Maghreb
Extent/Offences
No extensive research has been conducted on organised crime 38 -First, the proliferation of criminal organisations with substantial weapons supplies and access to financial resources. Their organisational structure is systematic and often also transnational. This development has been aided by increasingly convenient means of transportation and communication.
-Second, the strong and significantly increasing link between crime and the excessive use of violence; for instance, abductions, hostages takings, brutal robberies.
-Third, the internationalisation of gangs/organisations and the globalisation of their operational territory (keyword: the development of transnational organised crime) in narcotics, explosives and arms trafficking; the counterfeiting of money; the illegal trade in antiques, diamonds, etc., and terrorism.
However, there are also local factors -aside from those that encourage the development of organised crime -that are inherent to globalisation and merit attention. A central cause of crime is the high rate of youth unemployment and the lack of prospects for youths/young adults. The deterioration of purchasing power, despite consistently high subsidies since the 1980s, and increased social inequity in the Maghreb states are additional causes.
Counter-Measures against Organised Crime
Rising crime rates have prompted the introduction of anti-crime measures and measures to strengthen domestic security in the Maghreb states (and in the Middle East). However, the explanations for their implementation have differed. These measures have included specific crime-fighting programmes or security plans for one or more years; the formation of police units for specific offences; the improvement of equipment; and legislative measures, including new laws and stricter penal provisions. In Morocco and Algeria there has also been discussion about reforming the prison system (construction of new prisons, improved treatment of prisoners) as, according to local human rights organisations, the prisons are, given their disastrous over-population, mere "schools of crime". 41
Institutional-Personnel Level
The interior ministers of each of the three Maghreb states have reacted to the increase in crime with general and specific institutional-personnel measures: 
Equipment Measures
Technological developments and other factors have necessitated substantial equipment upgrades, 45 
Legislative Level
Legislative reactions to public security risks can be observed in each Maghreb state. These have occurred parallel to the institutional-personnel and material measures described. The further development of criminal law and the legal framework for the fight against criminal offences reflects the drastic social changes that have occurred in North African states. 48 Current legislative reactions can be summarised in three subcategories:
(
1) Modification of Existing Laws
The modification of existing laws has focused, on the one hand, on penal laws that have been and the accompanying drug-related crime not only in Morocco but also in the neighbouring transit and consumer states, led to the first legal regulations against the drug trade in the Maghreb states as early as the 1960s. Since then, and in proportion to the steady growth of the problem, the number of legally defined punishable offences has increased, 48 Tellenbach (1997) 
(2) Passing of New Guidelines and Laws
The passing of new guidelines and laws illustrates most clearly that crime is booming in North African societies. The new laws focus partially on old offences and partially on new ones. The fight against corruption belongs more to the first category. Particularly since the 1990s, security agencies and legislators have been trying to eradicate corruption -which has been rampant for decades and constitutes a destructive factor in politics, the economy and society -by means of laws and accompanying anti-corruption strategies. These legislative counter-measures are diverse and range from special punishments for corrupt judges (Algeria, government has also been undertaking extensive diplomatic efforts to convince the UN to adopt an international convention against ransom payments. 53
(3) Ratification of UN Conventions
The ratification of UN conventions is an important step in strengthening the judicial and legal foundation in Arab states, as the codification of UN conventions is generally stricter than national legislation and thus forces the latter to adapt to the provisions of the convention. in charge of five special offices in decentralised locations. 58 The offices' expertise is requested for specific issues. Cooperation within the council to date can be deemed successful because the body has not only adopted Arab conventions against drug trafficking and terrorism, but is also currently working on a convention against money laundering and is engaged in the fight against piracy. 59 Additionally, in recent years the further spread of AQMI activities (see above) has given rise to increased security cooperation in the Maghreb-Sahel region, which, however, occurs more at the military than the policing or intelligence-agency level. Thus, the general staffs of Morocco, Algeria, Mauretania, Niger and Mali convened on 3 August, 
The Development of Domestic Security since the Arab Spring
The protest movement that began in Tunisia in December 2010 and subsequently spread to the other Maghreb states (and Egypt) has had sustained effects on the domestic security of each state. These have been most serious in those states that have seen a change in political power.
The repercussions for security policy as a result of the political changes since early 2011 are of a two-fold nature and have occurred at two levels: the national and transnational level.
National Level
At the national level, a set of individual phenomena are discernible. However, the extent to which they are encountered in each state varies. One of these phenomena is the further discrediting of the police/security agencies. Due to their excessive use of firearms against demonstrators in Tunisia and Egypt, with several hundred dead, the police forces' reputation has continued to deteriorate in both countries, whereas the image of the armed forces has improved as they supported the protest movement and declared its aims legitimate. The Arab press is thus in agreement that the police are among the losing parties of the political transformation. 66 After the change of power in Tunisia and Egypt, the armies were the only functioning security force in each country; the regular police forces had largely withdrawn from the public arena, and the political police forces had been disbanded in Tunisia as well as in Egypt. The partial dissolution of the security structure -which the London-based International Institute for Security Studies (IISS) terms "security vacuum" -led to increasing opportunities for militant Islamist groups to reorganise. 67 The implementation of new "democratic police forces" has not yet extended beyond announcements or initial, rudimentary steps.
An increase in crime is the second phenomenon. In Tunisia (and Egypt) crime (burglaries, robberies) has drastically increased since the beginning of 2011. This development is directly linked to the political changes because armed groups intentionally freed many prisoners.
Eleven thousand convicted criminals in Tunisia and 20,000 in Egypt regained their freedom in this way. Only a few complied with police appeals to return to prison. In Tunisia there have been daily reports of criminal offences and gang crime (car theft, shop robberies, burglaries, etc.) since. Other offences have persisted at a high level. These include the trafficking of drugs and arms as well as the piracy of almost all products, from medicine to clothing to cosmetics.
The identification of security deficits by the security agencies has led the governments of the Maghreb states and the EU states to recognise the need to improve the counter-measures.
The Maghreb governments are more focused on the quantitative reform of their police apparatus and their security agencies; they have thus increased police personnel and emphasised better equipment and cooperation. Tools for suppressing public unrest, such as police vans, teargas and other equipment, are of particular interest and are being acquired in increasing quantities. In contrast, the EU states emphasise the necessity of reforming the security sector (police reform) and the judiciary, 68 with a focus on qualitative factors.
Transnational Level
At the transnational level the political changes have had repercussions for Europe with regard to three particular fields of security policy: illegal international migration, transnational terrorism and transnational crime.
Illegal migration from the Maghreb to Europe is an old phenomenon that involves two groups of persons.
-First, the migration of North Africans to Europe (predominantly younger adults without good life prospects, but also some highly qualified people). Since March 2011, there has been a wave of Libyans, including army officers, fleeing to Tunisia as a result of the civil war. In contrast, the sharp increase in migration of predominantly southern and southwestern Tunisians from Tunisia to Italy since January 2011 has been solely motivated by economic factors. These migrants' argument is that they do not see any economic pro- ticular because of the many migrants fleeing the fighting in Libya to southern Tunisia or back to Chad or Niger. 69 The eruption of the civil war caused a temporary humanitarian crisis because a total of almost 2,000,000 regular workers fleeing the fighting joined the illegal migrants.
Transnational terrorism has been a reality in the Maghreb region since, at the latest, the formation of the AQMI in 2006. Seizing the opportunities generated by the political unrest, AQMI has been increasing its activities since the beginning of 2011. AQMI has been responsible for the significant increase in attacks in eastern Algeria, the attack in Marrakesh Transnational crime has also benefitted from the security deficits since the beginning of 2011. This is particularly apparent in the significant increase in drug trafficking and counterfeiting, as well as burglary and the smuggling of valuable antiques.
Conclusion
According to a UN study published in October 2011 (UNODC 2011), deficient socio-economic development and the use of armed violence, particularly by organised criminal gangs and terrorist groups, are strongly correlated. Even though the Maghreb states -in comparison to Central American states, for example -do not occupy the top positions in violence/crime rankings, their domestic security is nevertheless threatened by organised crime and terrorism.
Additionally, the proliferation of weapons in the region as a consequence of the 2011 civil war in Libya has drastically exacerbated the situation.
In the past, the state leadership of each of the three core Maghreb states, and also of the eastern neighbour states Libya and Egypt, reacted to the security challenges caused by organised crime and terrorism. The counter-measures employed in all states included 1) increased personnel for and efficiency-enhancing reforms within the security agencies;
2) the significant increase in and upgrading of equipment for security agencies;
3) the strengthening of the legal foundation (laws, regulations) to legally combat these offences; 4) increased bilateral, regional and international cooperation in the field of security; and 5) the implementation of preventive measures.
69 By the end of April 2011, 54,000 Africans had entered Niger and 17,000 had entered Chad.
The focus of the state measures employed against security deficits in the Maghreb was on the quantitive increase in security personnel, the provision of better equipment, and the creation and implementation of national security plans. Due to the authoritarian state structures, the maintenance of domestic security at times entailed severe human rights violations. In contrast to democratic states -which face the dilemma of having to balance the efficiency and professionalism of their security agencies with the basic democratic standards of individual freedom, the protection of personal rights, transparency, and control -personal freedom and the integrity of the individual played, and continue to play, a subordinate role in the Maghreb states. Even after the political changes, human rights organisations accuse the security agencies of continuing to use torture. In the same way that the governing principle of Maghreb state leadership, the maintenance of domestic security, justified the unrestrained use of all available police measures, it is also obvious that the political reforms are governed by security policy considerations: political reforms will only be implemented in the Maghreb states if the leadership can largely rule out threats to security. 70 It can be assumed that organised crime and terrorist activities will continue at a significant level; first, because the socio-economic conditions -particularly high youth unemploy- herence to the rule of law. This situation represents a balancing act which will be very difficult to master. 70 Cf. Tlemcani, Rachid (2011) , Les réformes politiques obéissent à la logique de la normalisation sécuritaire, in:
El Watan, Algiers, 2 July.
